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Abstract
We test whether social comparison nudges can promote water-saving behaviour
among farmers as a complement to traditional CAP measures. We conducted a ran-
domised controlled trial among 200 farmers equipped with irrigation smart meters in
South-West France. Treated farmers received weekly information on individual and
group water consumption over four months. Our results rule out medium to large
effect-sizes of the nudge. Moreover, they suggest that the nudge was effective at
reducing the consumption of those who irrigate the most, although it appears to have
reduced the proportion of those who do not consume water at all.
Keywords: nudges, behavioural economics, irrigation water use, public policy
JEL classiﬁcation: D90, Q25, Q58
1. Introduction
Agricultural production is among the most water-intensive activities in the
European Union (EU).1 Water scarcity is already a key challenge in Southern
Europe and it is expected to become even more severe and widespread in the
coming years because of climate change. From 1960 to 2010, renewable
freshwater resources per capita have decreased by 24 per cent in Europe, par-
ticularly in southern Europe, and the key objectives of the Seventh
*Corresponding author: E-mail: philippe.lecoent@hotmail.fr
1 The Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector represents 51.4 per cent of total water use in the
European Union. These ﬁgures were provided by the website of the European Environment
Agency in 2017.
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Environment Action Programme concerning the quantitative management of
water between 2002 and 2014 have not been achieved (EEA, 2017).
Improving the efﬁciency of water use, including the efﬁciency of irrigation in
agriculture, is therefore one of the priorities of the CAP 2014–2020.2
To fulﬁl the objectives of the EU Water Framework Directive, which estab-
lished the principles of a common water policy in Europe in 2000, the
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) supports two
main types of measures at the European level: investment subsidies for water-
efﬁcient technologies and agri-environmental schemes where farmers commit
to reduce their use of water by substituting leguminous crops for more water-
intensive crops in exchange for a predetermined annual payment.3 In this article,
we consider a new policy instrument called a nudge, which is based on the ﬁnd-
ings of behavioural sciences and could complement existing CAP measures and
contribute to addressing the problem of water resources in Europe. Nudges use
subtle modiﬁcations of decision contexts to trigger pro-environmental beha-
viours without altering monetary incentives or the option set itself. A wide var-
iety of nudges have been identiﬁed in the literature, including those that
leverage individuals’ desires to maintain an attractive self-image and those that
exploit individuals’ inclinations to imitate the behaviour of their peers
(Schubert, 2017). This approach is increasingly being adopted in various public
policy contexts, like energy conservation or waste reduction. However, it has
received little attention with respect to its likely impact on agricultural practices.
In this article, we test whether social comparison nudges – reports comparing
individual consumption to the consumption of similar neighbours – can increase
water-saving behaviour among farmers.
There has been considerable interest recently in the ability of social com-
parison nudges to trigger changes in pro-environmental behaviours (Croson
and Treich, 2014; Schubert, 2017). Indeed, social comparison nudges can be
a cost-effective way to change behaviour even if their effects are small
because they can be applied to a large population at a small cost. Moreover,
social comparison nudges are likely to work because social comparison is
one of the most ubiquitous features of human social life. Indeed, individuals
often look to others as comparison standards for how to behave, think and
feel in order to smoothly coordinate economic exchange, political action and
social relationships (Baldwin and Mussweiler, 2018). The effect of social
comparison nudges on the adoption of pro-environmental behaviour relies on
two different psychological mechanisms. First, a social comparison nudge
informs about what other people do,4 which can provoke a change in behav-
iour that is motivated by a fear of receiving a social sanction (Sunstein,
2 Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December
2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005.
3 The conditions of the ﬁrst measure moreover require that farmers possess proof of the author-
isation to withdraw water for irrigation as well as a functioning water meter.
4 This is referred to as the descriptive meaning of the social norm (see Cialdini, Reno and
Kallgren (1990) and references therein).
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1996) or by a desire to conform based on the perception that the descriptive
norm reﬂects what is likely to be an effective action to undertake (Thøgersen,
2014). Second, by making the behaviour of others more salient at the
moment that a decision is being made, a social comparison nudge can inﬂu-
ence behaviour through automatic heuristics (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren,
1990).
Most of the empirical evidence described in the environmental economic
literature on green nudges has focused on consumers’ behaviour and has
been able to demonstrate signiﬁcant, albeit small, effects on electricity and
water consumption for example (Allcott, 2011; Ferraro, Miranda and Price,
2011; Byerly et al., 2018). It is still unclear though whether social compari-
son nudges can inﬂuence the behaviour of economic agents in a professional
or income-generating activity such as farming (Messer, Ferraro and William,
2015; Ferraro, Messer and Wu, 2017).5 There are good reasons to believe
that the responses to nudges of economic agents in a professional context
might differ from responses of consumers. On the one hand, if the activity to
be nudged is important for the economic agent’s income, they may react
intensely to new information about others’ practices. This assumption is sup-
ported by recent studies that highlight the inﬂuence of social norms in farm-
ers’ pro-environmental decisions (Burton, 2004; Kuhfuss et al., 2016; Le
Coent, Préget and Thoyer, 2018). On the other hand, it is also likely that
farmers have already reached a private optimum and are not likely to change
their behaviour following a non-monetary incentive. It thus remains an
empirical question as to whether social comparison nudges can be efﬁcient in
changing strategic agricultural practices, such as the amount of water used
for irrigation. This article aims to answer this question. It is, moreover, one
of the ﬁrst studies to present the results of a Randomised Controlled Trial
(RCT) in the European farming context (Behaghel, Macours and Subervie,
2019; Dessart, Barreiro-Hurle and van Bavel, 2019).6
This study was carried out in partnership with the Compagnie
d’Amenagement des Coteaux de Gascogne (CACG), the water distribution
company in charge of the management of irrigation infrastructure in the
Neste river basin in South West France. In this area, secure access to water
irrigation since the 19th century has led to the development of irrigation-
dependent crops such as maize and more recently soybean. Due to the pre-
vailing weather conditions in this area, the proﬁtability of the production of
these crops largely depends on access to water. In recent years, the increased
recurrence of droughts and the emergence of environmental constraints have
called for the adoption of water-efﬁcient agricultural practices. Strategic
changes, such as the adoption of drought-tolerant crops or new irrigation
5 The literature on the adoption of new agricultural technology showed that farmers may learn
about the characteristics of a new technology from their neighbours’ experiments (Conley and
Udry, 2001).
6 As Behaghel, Macours and Subervie (2019) point out, the implementation of an RCT represents
a real challenge in the European context, where evaluators are generally confronted with many
kinds of technical and political obstacles.
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equipment, are currently promoted by the CAP. Tactical adjustments, such as
more precise matching of irrigation activity to crop needs or the avoidance of
wasted water, also contribute to conserving the resource.
In the summer of 2017, we implemented an RCT among 200 farmers
equipped with smart meters, who were customers of the CACG, to test the
effectiveness of a social comparison nudge to reduce their use of water for
irrigation. The use of smart water meters and an automated texting platform
made it possible to send inexpensive weekly text messages that communi-
cated information to farmers about their own water use as well as that of their
neighbours. Our analysis of the data does not show any signiﬁcant impact of
the treatment on average total consumption. However, the treatment seems to
have decreased the proportion of farmers who consume more than 80 per
cent of their quota, which suggests that social comparison nudges can be
effective at inﬂuencing the behaviour of those who irrigate the most and who
are also presumably more likely to waste water. Our results moreover indi-
cate that the intervention triggered unexpected consumption decisions among
those who would have not consumed any water in the absence of interven-
tion, which is referred to as the boomerang effect in the literature.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews several key ﬁndings
in the rapidly growing literature on green nudges. Section 3 presents the con-
text of the study. Section 4 describes the experimental design and the data.
Section 5 presents the results. We discuss these results in Section 6 and con-
clude with policy implications in Section 7.
2. Literature on social comparison nudges
A large amount of research in economics and psychology has been devoted
to testing the effect of social comparison nudges on pro-environmental
behaviour using experimental approaches (Farrow, Grolleau and Ibanez,
2017). Social comparison nudges, based on a comparison between individual
consumption and collective group consumption, have been shown to have an
effect on the reduction of households’ electricity and water consumption
(Nolan et al., 2008; Allcott, 2011; Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011; Ayres,
Raseman and Shih, 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
Similar results have been obtained on curbside recycling (Schultz, 1999) and
guests’ towel reuse in hotels (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius, 2008).
There are, however, contradictory results on whether social comparison
nudges have long term effects, with some authors ﬁnding that they do
(Ferraro, Miranda and Price, 2011; Allcott and Rogers, 2014) and others that
they do not (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015).
Several studies have found evidence of a boomerang effect of social com-
parison nudges. Informing households of the behaviour of their peers, for
example, has been shown to drive some households to increase undesirable
behaviours (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno, 1991). Schultz et al. (2007) ﬁnd
that providing information on average energy usage produced either desirable
energy savings or on the contrary an increase of energy consumption,
396 S. Chabé-Ferret et al.
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depending on whether households were already consuming at a high or a low
rate, respectively. This boomerang effect was, however, eliminated when the
social information nudge was coupled with an injunctive norm message in
the form of an emoticon (a smiling face when consumption was below aver-
age), indicating that a below-average level of energy consumption is socially
desirable. In a similar way, Ayres, Raseman and Shih (2013) run two RCTs
in partnership with utility companies that provide electricity and natural gas
and ﬁnd that treated households that had been in the lowest deciles of energy
use prior to the treatment actually increase their energy usage in response to
the intervention.
Schubert (2017) provides two explanations for the boomerang effect. First,
providing information about the descriptive norm may give agents a so-
called ‘moral license’ to continue engaging in grey behaviour (Cialdini et al.,
2006). Second, the phenomenon may result from what social psychologists
refer to as ‘normalisation’, or the idea that individuals tend to move closer to
the norm they perceive as currently prevailing among their peers (Sherif,
1935). Some studies moreover suggest that heterogeneity in response to
social comparison nudges may also come from individual preferences. Costa
and Kahn (2013) show that social comparison nudges are two to four times
more effective with political liberals than with conservatives. Goldstein,
Cialdini and Griskevicius (2008) highlight that the inﬂuence of social com-
parison nudges depends on the extent to which individuals identify them-
selves with the reference group. Delmas and Lessem (2014) show that social
information has an effect only when it is made public.
Our paper contributes to two streams of literature. The ﬁrst one investi-
gates the impact of social norms on farmers’ decisions to adopt pro-
environmental practices (Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Fielding et al., 2005;
Defrancesco et al., 2008; Allaire, Cahuzac and Simioni, 2009; Willy and
Holm-Müller, 2013; Le Coent, Préget and Thoyer, 2018). These papers
reveal the inﬂuence of the decision and/or the opinion of others on the adop-
tion of pro-environmental practices or on participation in agri-environmental
programmes, but are limited by weak evidence of causality. All of these
papers rely on non-experimental approaches and run the risk of confounding
the effect of social norms with unobserved and spatially correlated confoun-
ders. The second stream of literature uses experimental approaches to
manipulate the information that is available to farmers on others’ behaviour,
in the form of social comparison nudges, and analyse the resulting impact on
farmers’ decisions. This literature intends both to provide causal evidence of
the role of social norms on farmers’ pro-environmental decisions and to test
the potential of social comparison nudges for their use agri-environmental
policies. Kuhfuss et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2009) analyse the impact of a
social comparison nudge on intentions to (i) maintain a pro-environmental
practice at the end of an AES and (ii) re-enrol in an AES programme,
respectively. Despite their experimental approaches, these papers evaluate the
impact of social comparison nudges on intentions rather than actual behav-
iour, which runs the risk of being affected by hypothetical bias. Other papers
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have also tackled the impact of social comparison nudges on farmer deci-
sions. Peth et al. (2018) conduct an extra-laboratory experiment (Charness,
Gneezy and Kuhn, 2013) that tests the impact of a social comparison nudge
on the likelihood of complying with the minimum-distance-to-water rule in
Germany. These decisions are, however, made in the context of a compu-
terised business management game. Wallander, Ferraro and Higgins (2017)
report on the results of a large scale RCT that tests the impact of a social
comparison nudge on farmer participation in the Conservation Reserve
Programme (CRP), the biggest agri-environmental programme in the United
States. Although participation in the CRP is a measure of actual behaviour, it
cannot be considered a pro-environmental agricultural practice per se. To our
knowledge, our paper is therefore one of the ﬁrst that reports on the effect of
a social comparison nudge on the adoption of pro-environmental practices by
farmers.
3. Context of the experiment
Our social comparison nudge was implemented in the Neste system located
in South-West France. The Neste system is a system of rivers artiﬁcially
recharged by upstream reservoirs located in the Pyrenées mountains through
the 29 km-long Neste canal, which was constructed between 1848 and 1862
to overcome low water levels in the rivers of Gascony. The Neste system
covers an area of 800,000 ha and gathers the catchment areas of 17 main
rivers. The land in this area is mainly dedicated to agriculture, with about
5,000 km2 cultivated, of which 50,000 ha are irrigated. The experiment is
implemented in three watersheds: Arros, Baises and Boues.
The Neste system is managed by a single operator, the CACG. The pub-
lic service mission of the CACG consists of contributing to the economic
development of the Neste area through land use planning and the manage-
ment of water resources. One important task of the CACG is to allocate
water across consumptive uses (domestic consumption, considered as an
absolute requirement, and irrigation, which can be limited in the event of a
drought) and quality requirements (ecological ﬂows). The relationship
between the CACG and the farmers using the CACG water network is
deﬁned by a formal contract. This contract speciﬁes a discharge rate and a
quota associated to each unit of discharge rate a farmer subscribes for.
Annual authorisations of water use, a sort of water right, are attributed in
each watershed by the French Single Water Users’ Associations
(Organisme Unique de Gestion Collective or OUGCs). The authorisations
are generally attributed on historical grounds (grandfathering) and are not
transferable. The OUGC attributes any extra water extraction rights to, in
order of priority: young farmers, new applications by farmers who do not
currently possess any water rights and, ﬁnally, farmers who wish to
increase the level of their existing water rights.
Irrigation metering is mandatory. The water pricing mechanism combines
a ﬁxed per unit price with volumetric pricing that is triggered when a
398 S. Chabé-Ferret et al.
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threshold of consumption is reached.7 In addition, for consumption above the
allocated quota, the volumetric price is multiplied by a factor of 5–10. In
some watersheds, the ﬁrst stage of volumetric pricing does not exist. For
example, in the Arros river, the quota is 1,900 m3/ha. In 2017, farmers paid a
ﬁxed price of 24€/ha with no volumetric pricing under the quota.8 Water con-
sumed above the quota is paid at 0.14€/m3. As a consequence, a farmer who
uses 110 per cent of the quota will pay 50.6€/ha on average. The price of
water is therefore very low when water use remains below the quota, but can
become very expensive once the quota is reached.
Agriculture is highly dependent on irrigation in the area of the experiment.
Maize and soybean represent a large majority of the irrigated crops, followed
to a lesser extent by sunﬂower, other cereals, tobacco and some vegetable
production. In order to manage their irrigation, farmers have access to weekly
technical bulletin that provides them with technical advice, information on
weather forecasts, crop water needs and the state of water reserves, but no
information on the irrigation practices of other farmers. The recent evolution
of rainfall patterns and the expected impacts of climate change increase the
pressure on water resources and the risk of defaults in the provision of water
to farmers throughout the cropping season. The CACG is therefore trying to
identify ways to reduce water use among farmers. Since 2004, the CACG has
started to replace its traditional water meters with smart meters named
CALYPSO meters.
The CALYPSO device is an ultrasonic meter that sends data in real time
to a web-interface. These smart meters have two objectives. First, the CACG
collects data on farmers’ water use in real time and therefore is better able to
manage collective water resources, which occurs through the release of water
from dams when farmers require it and the retainment of water when it will
not be used. Second, the information generated by smart meters can be used
to inﬂuence individual behaviour. In this paper, we intend to enhance our
knowledge regarding how to achieve this second objective by examining the
impact of the strategic use of the data generated by smart meters to send
social comparison nudges to farmers.
4. Experimental design and data
We ran an experiment in which we sent farmers information generated by
smart meters on individual and collective water consumption on a weekly
basis. This information was conveyed via an SMS-based communication sys-
tem managed by the CACG. We carried out two experiments in collaboration
with the CACG from July to September 2017 in the three watersheds of the
Neste System: Arros, Les Baises and Boues. The protocol of these
7 This threshold is around 80–85 per cent of the quota and the price ranges from 0.02 to 0.03€/m3.
8 Although the term quota is used by the CACG to deﬁne its contractual relationship with farmers,
it should be viewed more as a binomial pricing scheme than a quota stricto sensu. Farmers are
indeed allowed to go above their quota, but they may face a signiﬁcant marginal price increase
in that case.
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experiments has been registered in the American Economic Association’s
registry for randomised controlled trials (Le Coent, Chabé-Ferret and
Reynaud, 2017).
4.1. Description of the nudge
In both experiments, we test whether a social comparison nudge delivered by
weekly mobile text messages (11 in total) may have an effect on the amount
of water that farmers use for irrigation. In both experiments, farmers in the
treatment group received an invitation to optimise their water usage along
with an estimate of the average amount of water used by their neighbours.
The estimate of average water consumption used in the intervention was
computed using smart meter readings from the previous week. The smart
meter readings are sent to a centralised database, which enabled us to directly
observe farmers’ decisions and to compute the weekly average of water con-
sumption at the watershed level. The water consumption database is inte-
grated with an automated SMS platform, which enabled us to craft our
messages automatically and to send them directly to farmers’ mobile phones.
Experiment 1 was run with a sample of 200 farmers equipped with
CALYPSO smart meters. One-hundred and one farmers were randomly
assigned to the control group and 99 to the treatment group. The control
group received the following normative message: ‘Hello Mr X. Water conser-
vation is important for your watershed. Please continue to optimise your irri-
gation.’ In addition to this normative message, farmers in the treatment group
received information about their own water consumption as well as the aver-
age level of water consumption at the watershed level: ‘As of DD/MM, you
have consumed XX percent of your water quota. The irrigating farmers in
your watershed have used on average XX percent of their quota’. Moreover,
for farmers whose water consumption was below average receive a message
of congratulations, inserted in the normative message: ‘As of DD/MM, you
have consumed XX percent of your water quota. CONGRATULATIONS!
The irrigating farmers in your watershed have used on average XX percent
of their quota’.
Experiment 2 was run with a sample of 261 farmers equipped with trad-
itional water meters. The treatment (131 farmers) and control groups received
the same message as received by farmers in Experiment 1, except that they
were not provided any feedback on their own consumption (since such infor-
mation is not provided by traditional meters).
4.2. Expected effects of the nudge
Our experimental design is aimed at testing the hypothesis that the above
described social comparison nudges can reduce average water consumption.
Such a hypothesis is likely to hold if two mechanisms occur simultaneously:
farmers who are informed that their consumption is above average will
400 S. Chabé-Ferret et al.
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reduce their consumption to conform to the norm, while farmers who are
informed that their consumption is below average will not adjust their con-
sumption since they already engage in the desired behaviour. As mentioned
in Section 2, reasons for farmers to conform to the norm may be (i) the fear
of receiving a social sanction, (ii) the fact that the norm reveals what is likely
to be effective behaviour and (iii) automatic heuristics.
In the context of a shared water resource, a social comparison nudge may
also exacerbate the risk of over-consumption. Indeed, irrigation systems are a
typical common-pool resource (Ostrom, 1992) and it is well known that the
‘tragedy of the commons’ may occur in highly valued open-access commons
(Hardin, 1968). By learning that the average consumption of the watershed is
low (at least lower than their own consumption), farmers can deduce that
large quantities of water are available and therefore choose to increase their
consumption. This strategic effect is the opposite of the intended social norm
effect and no prior evidence enables us to anticipate which of the two will
prevail.
4.3. Speciﬁc features of the nudge
Our design has six important features. First, sending messages to the control
group enables us to avoid Hawthorne effects, i.e. behavioural changes that
result simply from an awareness that one is being observed. In most experi-
ments on electricity consumption the control group did not receive any mes-
sage, which has led to criticisms that the social information effects detected
may only be due to Hawthorne effects (Schwartz et al., 2013).
Second, we measure water consumption as a share of the water quota
rather than the volumetric consumption. Water consumption expressed as a
share of the quota can be used to compare water consumption for farms of
different sizes and producing different crops. Providing consumption infor-
mation in terms of share of the quota also reduces the cognitive burden as
farmers also pay for their water use according to this same indicator of
consumption.
Third, the social information on water use is provided at the watershed
level (and for the Arros river, also at the province level). We consider that
the reference level of water consumption should be associated with a group
that shares a similar social identity (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius,
2008) or a similar production context.
Fourth, we exclude farmers with zero consumption when computing the
average consumption (in percentage of the quota) for each geographical
group of farmers equipped with CALYPSO smart meters. With this decision,
we wanted to avoid confusing farmers by confounding decisions made on the
intensive and extensive margins.
Fifth, farmers whose water consumption is below average receive a
‘Congratulations’ message that aims to neutralise a possible ‘boomerang’
effect (Schultz et al., 2007).
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Sixth, we do not send the ‘congratulations’ message to farmers who have
not used any water at all, as we assume that this may not be the result of a
particular effort but rather characterises farmers that are not using their water
rights due to their choices of crops for that year.
4.4. Sampling and data
In both experiments, the treatment group was determined using a stratiﬁed
random sampling method. In Experiment 1, the strata were deﬁned by (i) col-
lective or individual irrigation facility9; (ii) river basin; (iii) province; (iv)
size of the quota and (v) initial consumption at the beginning of the experi-
ment (null or positive). In Experiment 2, the strata were deﬁned by: (i) col-
lective or individual irrigation facility10; (ii) river basin; (iii) size of the quota
and (iv) consumption as a share of the quota in 2016.
We were informed just before the start of the experiment that some smart
meters did not communicate results properly. In order to control for this
problem, farmers with defective smart meters were included in a strata.11 In
what follows, we report the results only for the 152 farmers who had func-
tioning smart meters during the whole period. For this subset of farmers, we
have 11 water consumption observations (including the one collected before
the experiment started). In Experiment 2, data collection was lengthier, as
CACG staff were required to travel to the farms in order to read the water
consumption on the meters. For this experiment we have only one observa-
tion: cumulative water consumption as of February 12, from 239 out of the
261 farmers who were initially part of the experiment. This is due to the clos-
ure of 22 contracts during the season.
After randomisation, the balance between the treatment and control groups
was tested regarding water quota, water consumption in 2016 (in volume),
water consumption in 2016 (as a share of quota) and water consumption in
2017 before the start of the experiment (as a share of quota). We moreover
crossed the data set with the 2010 Agricultural Census and were able to
examine the balance regarding several additional variables, as shown in
Table 1.
5. Results
We ﬁrst examine the effect of the social comparison nudges on total water
consumption in each experiment. This analysis was pre-registered. We then
9 Collective irrigation facility, or ASA, group several farmers. There were initially four ASAs in
Experiment 1. ASAs, although they represent several farmers, are considered as single observa-
tions in our sample since we do not have information on the consumption of individual farmers.
In the interest of simplicity, we refer to water users as farmers throughout the text. Only ASA
leaders received the weekly text messages.
10 There are 19 ASAs in Experiment 2.
11 These farmers received the same information as farmers of Experiment 2 for the beginning of
the experiment. Beginning on 22 August 2017, 30 farmers had their smart meters repaired and
started receiving complete information.
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examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects. This last part of the analysis
was not pre-registered. We present these results nevertheless, since they pro-
vide interesting additional insights regarding the effects of a social compari-
son nudge.
Table 1. Main characteristics of farmers by group
Mean values
Sample used in Experiment 1 Nb. obs. Treated Control t-stat
1. Irrigated land (ha) 152 23.4 29.3 0.09
2. Water consumption in 2016 (m3) 152 23,529 35,124 0.95
3. Water consumption in 2016 (% of quota) 152 0.49 0.42 −0.68
4. Water consumption on 5 July 2017 (% of quota) 152 0.058 0.06 0.14
5. Farmer’s age (years) 111 53.05 55.16 −1.07
6. Farm size (ha) 111 87.67 88.90 −0.11
7. Total maize sown area (ha) 111 33.90 31.08 0.41
8. Irrigated maize area (ha) 111 27.10 28.67 −0.23
9. Total irrigated area (ha) 111 37.25 36.67 0.08
10. Area under property (ha) 111 35.55 36.98 −0.21
11. Agricultural farming (yes = 1) 111 0.05 0.07 −0.41
12. Annual work unit (number) 111 2,013 1,514 1.52
13. Farmers and co-farmers (number) 111 1.46 1.24 1.94
14. Dairy cows (number) 111 9.52 10.45 −0.22
15. Suckler cows (number) 111 15.63 10.96 1.00
Sample used in Experiment 2
16. Irrigated land (ha) 239 34.2 27.1 −1.01
17. Water consumption in 2016 (m3) 239 71,533 59,590 −0.62
18. Water consumption in 2016 (% of quota) 239 0.49 0.48 −0.22
19. Farmer’s age (years) 166 54.09 54.11 −0.01
20. Farm size (ha) 166 82.10 94.19 −0.26
21. Total maize sown area (ha) 166 33.23 32.62 0.11
22. Irrigated maize area (ha) 166 30.58 29.60 0.18
23. Total irrigated area (ha) 166 36.65 35.54 0.19
24. Area under tenant farming (ha) 166 55.55 66.36 −1.03
25. Area under property (ha) 166 26.55 27.83 −0.25
26. Agricultural farming (yes = 1) 166 0.06 0.04 0.79
27. Annual work unit (number) 166 1,674 2,015 −1.46
28. Farmers and co-farmers (number) 166 1.46 1.36 0.97
29. Dairy cows (number) 166 3.90 5.45 −0.59
30. Suckler cows (number) 166 13.90 11.01 0.58
Note: Sources of data are CACG (lines 1–4 and 16–18) and French Agricultural Census (lines 5–15 and 19–30).
Some CACG farmers were not found in the census (because their identiﬁcation number was not available or the
farm did not exist yet when the census took place), which is why the number of observations is lower for census
variables.
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5.1. Impact on total and weekly water consumption
Figure 1 shows the cumulative water consumption over time in Experiment
1. These results suggest that the gap between the two groups widens over
time, and that consumption tends to be higher in the control group than in the
treated group after 22 August. As shown in Table 2, this difference is, how-
ever, not very large and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference
between groups at the end of the period. The average consumption in the
treated group reaches 26 per cent of the quota on September 12 (Col. 1) com-
pared to 27 per cent in the control group (Col. 2). For Experiment 2, we ﬁnd
Fig. 1. Cumulative water consumption over time by group (Experiment 1).
Table 2. Impacts of the nudge on water consumption
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Nb.
obs. Treated Control Difference
Nb.
obs. Treated Control Difference
Consumption
(% of quota)
152 0.257 0.274 −0.015
(0.043)
239 0.252 0.238 0.01
(0.028)
Consumption = 0
(yes = 1)
152 0.293 0.39 −0.102*
(0.054)
239 0.342 0.286 0.067
(0.049)
Consumption > 0.8
(yes = 1)
152 0.027 0.104 −0.075*
(0.040)
239 0.025 0.025 0.000
(0.021)
0 < Consumption
< 0.8 (yes = 1)
152 0.68 0.506 0.177***
(0.061)
239 0.633 0.689 −0.067
(0.051)
Note: This table provides the mean value of various outcomes by group as well as the results of OLS regressions of the
treatment variable on these outcomes. All regressions include strata ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***, ** and * indicate a treatment effect signiﬁcantly different from zero in a two sided t-test at 1, 5 and 10 per cent,
respectively.
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that 25 per cent of the quota is used in the treated group (Col. 4) and 24 per
cent is used in the control group (Col. 5).12 Again, the null hypothesis of no
impact cannot be rejected.
We then turn to weekly water consumption levels to investigate whether
the intervention had an effect during particular periods of the experiment.
Figure 2 reveals that the gap between the two groups peaked on 22 and 29
August. Given our level of precision, we are, however, unable to detect sig-
niﬁcant differences in water consumption at these dates.
5.2. Heterogeneous effects of the intervention
We then examine whether the absence of an average treatment effect con-
ceals opposing heterogeneous effects within the sample. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of water consumption in both groups in Experiment 1. Three
main results emerge. First, the number of farmers consuming no water is
higher in the control group. Second, the number of farmers whose consump-
tion exceeds 80 per cent of the quota is smaller in the treatment group. Third
(and consequently), the number of farmers consuming some water but less
than 80 per cent of their quota is larger in the treatment group. This suggests
that the social comparison nudge prompted some farmers who would not
have consumed water to start consuming and also changed the behaviour of
high consumers, discouraging them from consuming more than 80 per cent
their quota.
Fig. 2. Weekly water consumption over time by group (Experiment 1).
12 An analysis of the effect of the intervention on volumetric consumption per hectare conﬁrms
this absence of effect: we ﬁnd a negative but insigniﬁcant effect of the social comparison nudge
of −79.1 m3/ha (±194.5) in Experiment 1 and 10.4 m3/ha (±205.9) in Experiment 2.
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Statistical analysis broadly supports the impression generated by Figure 3.
Table 2 shows the results of OLS regressions of the treatment variable on a
dummy variable that equals one when a farmer does not consume any water
during the season and zero otherwise. The results show that the intervention
signiﬁcantly decreased the proportion of farmers who did not consume water
by 10 percentage points, from 39 to 29 per cent on average.13 Figure 4, more-
over, shows that this effect appeared gradually over the course of the experi-
mental period. Note that this estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per
cent level only – the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval is 10.2 ± 10.6 percent-
age points – and this is only suggestive of possible effects.14
Table 2 also provides the results of OLS regressions of the treatment vari-
able on a dummy variable that equals one when a farmer consumed more
than 80 per cent of the quota during the season and zero otherwise. The
results indicate that the intervention signiﬁcantly decreased the proportion of
farmers who consumed more than 80 per cent of their quota by 7 percentage
points, from 10 to 3 per cent. Again, this estimate is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10 per cent level only and the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval is 7.5 ± 7.8
percentage points. Accordingly, the proportion of farmers who consumed
more moderately, i.e. between zero and 80 per cent, signiﬁcantly increased
by 17 percentage points – from 51 to 68 percentage points. This result is
more precise than the previous ones: 17.7 ± 12.0 percentage points, suggest-
ing that the nudge yields to a clustering of water consumption around the
mean in Experiment 1.
Fig. 3. Distribution of water consumption by group (Experiment 1).
13 We moreover ran robustness checks in order to take into account meter replacement during
Experiment 1. The same results hold. They are displayed in Table A1.
14 We express the precision of our results by reporting the size of the half 95 per cent conﬁdence
interval around them.
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We then ran the same regressions using data from Experiment 2. The
results do not reveal any of the effects detected in Experiment 1.
6. Discussion
Although the results of this pilot cannot yet be generalised, they call for
some comments. We discuss ﬁve important features of the study in the
following.
6.1. Two experiments
The RCT methodology provides a good control for selection bias. In each of
the experiments, the control and treatment groups are not systematically dif-
ferent before our intervention for observable and unobservable variables,
thanks to the spatially stratiﬁed random allocation of the treatment. This is
veriﬁed with the balancing tests presented in Table 1. We therefore consider
the results of each experiment to be trustworthy. The allocation between
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was not, however, under our control.
Farmers equipped with smart meters are treated in Experiment 1 and those
with classic meters are treated in Experiment 2. Being in one experiment or
the other therefore depends on how the installation of smart meters was car-
ried out. The CACG did not indicate any systematic bias in the roll out of
smart meters. We can therefore compare the results of the two experiments in
order to reﬁne the interpretation of our results, but this comparison is limited
by a potential selection bias between the two experiments.
Fig. 4. Number of farmers with no water consumption over time (Experiment 1).
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6.2. Speciﬁcity of the context
The results of each experiment are speciﬁc to each of their speciﬁc contexts,
especially regarding weather conditions. The winter of 2017 was very dry,
which led to a limited water reserve in the dams at the beginning of the grow-
ing season. Water quotas had already been reduced at the onset of the season
in anticipation of a water shortage. Nevertheless, the growing season was
marked by regular rainfall that eased the fear of water restrictions and
reduced the use of irrigation. There is therefore a need to replicate these
experiments in different contexts in order to explore the extent to which our
results can be generalised. It is possible, for example, that the reduction in
water use among high consumers observed in Experiment 1 would be of a
lower magnitude in a dryer year because the marginal cost of complying with
the norm (i.e. by reducing irrigation) would be larger. Similar trade-offs
between social or cultural norms and economic incentives have already been
found with respect to fertility decisions (Chabé-Ferret, 2016).
6.3. Farmers versus consumers
Our results suggest that professional farmers do not seem to react much more
to social comparison nudges than consumers do. Previous results indeed
show that the effect of social comparison nudges on electricity or water con-
sumption by households are very small, in terms of Cohen’s d (Baguley,
2009).15 We reject large and medium effects of the social comparison nudge
in both of our experiments. For water consumption, the Cohen’s d corre-
sponding to the extreme of the 95 per cent conﬁdence interval of the impact
of the nudge is −0.29 in Experiment 1 and −0.13 in Experiment 2. Our
results nevertheless leave open the possibility that farmers respond slightly
more than households to social comparison nudges. It remains to be seen
whether farmers react in the same way as consumers (with very small
responses), more (with small responses) or not at all. Larger, more precise
experiments will be needed in order to answer this question.
6.4. Boomerang effect
The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence of a boomerang effect of a
social comparison nudge among professional economic agents. We believe
that some farmers who had not originally planned to use water ended up
using some after receiving the nudge. One explanation for this result might
be that some farmers who did not plan to use water nonetheless decided to
use some on crops that usually do not require much water, such as sun-
ﬂowers, or that can grow without irrigation (which comes at a cost in terms
15 A large effect is deﬁned as a Cohen’s d of the order of 0.8. A medium effect is deﬁned as a
Cohen’s d of the order of 0.5. A small effect is deﬁned as a Cohen’s d above 0.2 and a very small
effect as Cohen’s d of the order of 0.01. Cohen’s d is computed by dividing the treatment effect
by the standard deviation of outcomes in the control group.
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of yields), such as soybeans. Two features of our experiment may have com-
bined to generate a boomerang effect at the extensive margin. First, we did
not add the ‘congratulations’ message for farmers with zero consumption
since we were unsure how they would interpret this message. Second, we
only computed average water consumption for farmers who consumed a
strictly positive amount of water, in order not to confuse farmers about inten-
sive versus extensive margins of water consumption. We tried to make this
clear in the message by saying that the average consumption is computed for
farmers that do irrigate. But if interpreted incorrectly as an unconditional
average, and in combination with the absence of a ‘Congratulations’ moder-
ator, this may well have given the impression to farmers who were not con-
suming water that everybody else was consuming water and that we were
encouraging them to do so too.
The results from Experiment 2 may help to shed some light on the reasons
for the boomerang effect. The results from Experiment 2 do not provide evi-
dence in favour of a boomerang effect. Because Experiment 2 only differs
from Experiment 1 insofar as farmers in the former are not sent information
on their own consumption, we see at least four possible explanations for the
lack of treatment effect in Experiment 2. First, comparing their own con-
sumption with that of their neighbours might have triggered those who previ-
ously consumed no water to begin consuming water. This interpretation is a
bit contrived since one may assume that farmers who do not consume any
water are already aware of this. Although we do not provide any additional
information to these farmers in Experiment 1 as compared to Experiment 2,
we do increase the salience of the comparison between their own lack of con-
sumption and the positive consumption of others. This difference in salience
between experiments may therefore help to explain the boomerang effect
observed in Experiment 1.
Second, it is possible that receiving information on their own consumption
does not in fact impact farmers consuming no water. If this is the case, the
provision of this information in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2 cannot
be a source of the difference in treatment effects observed, and may instead
only be the result of sampling noise (given that the conﬁdence intervals in
both experiments overlap) or of differences in the samples between
Experiments 1 and 2.
A third possible interpretation is that farmers who received information
that they have not used their quota every week may have felt scrutinised by
the CACG for their absence of water consumption, despite owning the rights
to do so. They may even have felt the threat of losing their water quota for
the following year, which could have led them to use some water in order to
avoid this threat.
Fourth, a ﬁnal possibility is that receiving information regarding their own
consumption revealed to farmers in Experiment 1 that they had dysfunctional
smart meters. If farmers in the treatment group that had consumed some
water received information that their registered consumption was actually
zero, they may have called the CACG and requested a new smart meter,
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thereby increasing their registered consumption. Since only the treated farm-
ers in Experiment 1 were able to compare their registered consumption with
their actual consumption, this behaviour might have generated a spurious
boomerang effect. After further investigation, however, we discard this possi-
bility: we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more smart meter replacements in the trea-
ted sample of Experiment 1 than in the control sample (16 vs. 13), and the
same boomerang effect holds when removing farmers whose smart meters
had been replaced from the sample, as shown in Appendix A. More research
will be needed in order to estimate this potential boomerang effect with more
precision and to investigate whether sending a ‘Congratulations’ message
would make this undesirable effect disappear.
6.5. Strategic behaviour
The third takeaway from this work is that the hypothesis that strategic behav-
iour leads to the tragedy of the commons cannot alone explain the data.
Indeed, while the boomerang effect among low water consumers observed in
Experiment 1 is compatible with a tragedy of the commons narrative, the
decrease in consumption at the top of the distribution is not. On the contrary,
a tentative interpretation of this result is that the farmers who consume the
most reduced their consumption in order to conform to the prevailing norm.
We cannot, however, disentangle whether farmers follow this norm out of
fear of receiving a social sanction, because the nudge provided information
regarding behaviour that is likely to be effective, or through automatic heuris-
tics. There is also another possible interpretation of the reduction of large
consumption: it might be due to treated farmers being more aware of the pre-
cise level of their consumption of their quota and stopping their use of water
before going above the quota. This is a real possibility, since it is not easy
for farmers to keep track of the share of their quota that they have already
consumed. More research will be needed in order to explore the robustness
of this effect as well.
7. Conclusion
Although improving efﬁciency of water use in agriculture has been a clear
objective of the European CAP for a long time, water scarcity remains a crit-
ical issue in Europe, especially in the Mediterranean regions. Agriculture
must therefore both contribute to the mitigation of this problem and adapt to
the expected increase in droughts. This situation provides an opportunity to
design and implement new tools to encourage water conservation among
farmers. Among these tools, nudges are considered to be a promising policy
tool that is able to complement the other tools already used by European pub-
lic authorities (EESC, 2017). Nudges also constitute a lower-cost intervention
than can potentially be applied to all farmers, unlike other CAP instruments,
which are generally based on voluntary participation.
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In this paper, we report on an experiment designed to test whether a social
comparison nudge can contribute to promote water-saving behaviour in agri-
culture. Although our results do not reveal a large or even moderate reduction
in average water use, they are nevertheless compatible with the small to very
small effects that have been found with respect to the household consumer
behaviour. We detect indications of reduction in water consumption among
the largest water users, but at the same time the intervention appeared to
have stimulated water consumption among farmers who did not previously
use any water. The absence of a medium to large treatment effect, as well as
indications of an undesirable boomerang effect, calls for (i) larger-scale
experiments to be conducted in order to be able to detect effects of a smaller
magnitude and (ii) a careful testing of nudges before scaling up their use.
More research is therefore needed to strengthen our conclusions on the inter-
est of nudges and avoid potential undesirable effects.
The ﬁrst direction for further research is to improve the precision of the
measured impact of social comparison nudges on water consumption. We are
clearly in need of experiments with greater power, with sample sizes in the
order of thousands of farmers, in order to be able to detect potentially small
effects. One possibility would be to run a large experiment, or to combine
several similar experiments, across several EU countries that suffer from
water scarcity and where farmers are equipped with smart meters.
The second direction for further research is to improve the targeting of
nudges in order to avoid the boomerang effect. Simple strategies such as not
sending messages to individuals who use below-average levels of water are
possible. More complex strategies might involve the use of Machine
Learning methods to determine which farmers react the most to a nudge.
A third direction for further research is to try to improve the effectiveness
of the message itself. One way to do this would be to tailor the reference
group used to compute average consumption to make it closer to the proﬁle
of each farmer. The effectiveness of social comparison nudges depends on
whether farmers identify themselves with the reference group used in the
nudge (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius, 2008). In our experiment, we
endeavoured to use a ‘valid’ reference group by communicating the average
consumption of farmers in the same department and watershed, i.e. ‘neigh-
bour’ farmers. The use of the consumption in terms of percentage of quota
was also chosen in order to ensure comparable values among farmers with
different size farms. Ideally, providing more tailored reference groups for
farmers of the same type (for example, maize growers/soya growers) would
likely be more effective. However, water consumption by farmer type is cur-
rently not available. Another approach would be to express social compari-
sons in monetary terms instead of the percentage of the quota that has been
used.16
A fourth direction for further research would be to try to ﬁnd ways to test
for strategic interactions with respect to water consumption. One interesting
16 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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possibility offered by smart meters and SMS technologies is the ability to
monitor each other’s consumption so that enforcing a cooperative equilibrium
might become easier if punitive actions such as public sanctions can be used.
A ﬁfth direction for further research is to test how nudges interact with
other types of information, such as information on alternative irrigation tech-
niques or weather forecasts, or with other policies, such as peak pricing.
Some recent work indeed suggests that there are conditions under which
nudges and taxes should coexist (Farhi and Gabaix, 2017). As a case in point,
it might be optimal for the CACG to implement a positive price for the ﬁrst
units of water consumption in order to decrease the magnitude of the boom-
erang effect.
If more evidence conﬁrms that social comparison nudges can curb farmers’
water consumption, an important question nevertheless remains: how could
this type of nudge be concretely implemented and how it could be incorpo-
rated in the CAP? A ﬁrst task would be to determine which institution would
be responsible for implementing such nudges. Authorities in charge of water
management at the local scale could be the appropriate institutional setting.
In France, OUGCs could be the appropriate structures. These water user asso-
ciations are indeed in charge of managing and distributing water quotas
among farmers over a given territory. Their relatively small size and the fact
that all farmers belong to the same territory could make social comparison
nudges effective tools for agricultural water management at this scale.
Similar institutions also exist in other European countries (i.e. Water User
Associations in Spain, Greece and Italy). The reform of the CAP could then
include actions targeted at promoting the use of nudges in agricultural water
user associations. Since implementing nudges requires some technical expert-
ise that may not be available in agricultural water user associations, some
ﬁnancial aid for a nudge training programme could be considered for the
post-2020 CAP.
A second prerequisite for using this type of nudge is the metering of agri-
cultural water use. The social comparison nudge we developed and assessed
in our experimental setting should then be viewed as a complement to water
metering. Water metering is already a policy tool included in the CAP. More
precisely, the new Rural Development Regulation for the 2014–2020 pro-
gramming period contains particular safeguards with respect to support for
investments in irrigation, speciﬁcally, linking it to water metering. In add-
ition, the EU (2011) explicitly mentions smart metering in the portfolio of
water efﬁciency measures to be included in the road map to a resource efﬁ-
cient Europe. Some mechanisms to subsidy investments in smart water
meters could then be included in the new CAP 2021–2028. This is in line
with the 1 June 2018 legislative proposals on the common agricultural policy
(CAP) beyond 2020 presented by the European Commission. This proposal
stresses the fact that the reform of the CAP should encourage increased
investment in innovation, which is essential for a smart, resilient and sustain-
able agricultural sector. Smart water meters could be part of these innovative
investments.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Robustness checks
In order to take into account meter replacement during Experiment 1, we
use different strategies. In model (1) we exclude from the data-set farmers
who had their meters changed less than 2 weeks before the end of the experi-
ment. In model (2), we exclude all farmers who had their meters changed
between 1 July 2017 and 1 December 2017. We indeed consider that meters
replaced after the end of experiment may have biased the results during the
experiment. We, however, consider that replacement that occurred after 1
December 2017 are due to problems that happened after the experiment and
therefore did not affect our results. In model (3), the most restrictive, we
exclude all farmers with meters changed between 1 July 2017 and 15 March
2018.
Table A1. Impact of nudges on probability to use no water in Experiment 1 with differ-
ent models taking into account meter replacement
(1) (2) (3)
Nudge −0.115** −0.091* −0.139**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
Cons. 1*** 1*** 1***
(0.325) (0.330) (0.314)
F 12.10 14.33 11.95
N 148 137 123
Note: These OLS regressions include strata ﬁxed effects.
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